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Abstract
Although much has been written about the implications of monopoly power for the rate
of extraction of natural resources, the speciﬁcc a s ei nw h i c ht h er e s o u r c ec a nb es o l di nt w o
markets with diﬀerent elasticities of demand has escaped notice. We ﬁnd that a monopolist
facing two markets with diﬀering iso-elastic demand schedules extracts more rapidly than the
social planner, whether or not arbitrage prevents price discrimination between markets. This
analysis is relevant in the case of many resources — such as natural gas used for power generation
and household heating, or petroleum used for making plastics and as fuel.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A number of authors have written on the implications of monopoly for the extraction of an ex-
haustible resource1. However, based on these and our own review of the literature, there has been
no previous analysis of a relatively simple but important case, namely, one in which the sole owner
of a resource can sell to two markets at diﬀerent prices. Although only a slight variation on the
model in Stiglitz (1976), which features constant elasticity of demand with zero extraction costs,
our basic model does not yield the result that the monopolist extracts at the same rate as the so-
cial planner. Nor does it conﬁrm Hotelling’s suggestion that the monopolist is the conservationist’s
best friend. Instead, a monopolist facing two markets with diﬀering iso-elastic demand schedules
extracts more rapidly than the social planner.2
When the monopolist can discriminate between the two markets, it sets prices so that they rise
at the rate of interest, as does the social planner. However, unlike the planner, the monopolist
ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to set a diﬀerent price in each market, and these prices are such that the quantity
sold in the market with low demand elasticity is less than the socially optimal quantity, while
the quantity sold in the market with relatively high demand elasticity is greater than the socially
optimal quantity. The total quantity sold is higher than under the social planner. When arbitrage
forces the monopolist to sell at the same price in both markets, the monopolist acts like a social
planner in that prices are equal, but these prices diﬀer from those of the social planner, rising in
such a way that they encourage faster consumption of the resource.
These results are not just of academic interest, since many resources have multiple uses. In a
number of cases, resources are sold in segmented markets where arbitrage is diﬃcult. For example,
petroleum is sold for both energy generation and plastics, and gold is mined for uses ranging from
jewelry, coins and dentistry to coating electronic contacts and stereo speaker wires and toning silver
images in photography. In such cases, the resource may have a diﬀerent set of substitutes in each
of the market in which it sold, which in turn inﬂuences its demand in that market. For instance,
there may be many alternatives to gold for use in electronics, but few others for use in engagement
1Reviews of this literature are included in Dasgupta and Heal (1979); Devarajan and Fisher (1981); and Krautkrae-
mer (1998).
2A similar result in which the monopolist extracts too rapidly is provided by Lewis et al. (1979), who obtain this
result both when there are ﬁxed costs that do not vary with the extraction rate, as well as when demand elasticities
vary with consumption, instead of time.
2rings. With a diﬀerent demand curve for gold in each market, the monopolist may, in addition to
its ability set a higher price in each market, also be able to engage in price discrimination between
markets. In this situation, we ﬁnd that the monopolist extracts the resource at a rate that is greater
than socially optimal in the market where demand is relatively elastic, and at a rate that is smaller
than socially optimal in the market where demand is relatively inelastic.
2M o d e l
Consider a single exhaustible resource that is sold in two separate markets with two diﬀerent
elasticities of demand. Let us call these two markets A and B. Total stock of the available resource
is K0. We make the following assumptions:
1. There is no cost to extracting the resource other than the scarcity value.
2. The elasticity of demand in each market is constant and greater than 1.
3. There is no possibility for arbitrage between markets. Moreover, the monopolist cannot
engage in price discrimination within each market.
The ﬁrst two assumptions are identical to those made by Stiglitz (1976) and may be unduly
restrictive. However, our choice of functional form is for essentially the same reason as the earlier
paper, namely for analytical tractability and intuitive transparency. We ﬁnd that the results of
this paper are robust to other functional forms as well, although the analysis is far more tedious
and far less intuitive. Since our purpose is, in part, to contrast the implications of monopoly for
the rates of extraction and consumer welfare in the two markets, the choice of demand function is
less critical than for comparing the overall outcome with that achieved by a social planner. The
third assumption is added for our two-market problem in order to determine how a monopolist’s
behavior compares with that of a social planner, both with respect to the quantity sold in each
market and to total extraction. Our ﬁnal caveat relates to the structure of the model, which is set
up with a eventual exhaustion constraint where the sum of quantities extracted over the planning
horizon is set equal to the initial stock. This assumption is also made for ease of exposition, and
an alternate approach to solving the problem using optimal control methods could be followed.
32.1 Social Planner’s Problem
We frame the optimal resource allocation problem in terms of a social planner maximizing welfare
(deﬁned as total consumer surplus, since costs are absent) with respect to quantities sold in markets
A and B,d e n o t e db yqA
t and qB
t , subject to the constraint that total extraction not exceed the
available resource stock. The resulting equilibrium corresponds to the market allocation under



















t )dt − K0
¶
, (1)
where r denotes the discount rate, PA and PB denote the price of the resource in the two markets,
and λ is the shadow price of the resource. The optimum is characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions
with respect to resource sales in each market
qA
t > 0,P A(qA
t )=ertλ; (2)
qB
t > 0,P B(qB
t )=ertλ; (3)






t )dt ≤ K0; (4)
where a binding total extraction constraint leads to a positive shadow value of the resource (λ).3










t ); t =[ 0 ,∞]. (6)
First, prices in each market rise over time at the rate of interest. Second, in an equilibrium
where the planner is selling in both markets, those prices must be equal, reﬂecting equivalent scarcity















t )dt − K0
¶
=0
If some of the stock were left unexploited, then λ =0 , but this would imply from 2 and 3 that prices were zero and
extraction positive in all periods, which would violate the constraint of a ﬁnite stock. Thus, λ > 0.




where η is the elasticity (in absolute value terms), while µ represents a shifting parameter, indicating
the relative size of the market. In our examples, we will designate market B as the one with the
greater elasticity (ηB > ηA). Since for these inverse demand functions, price goes to inﬁnity as
quantity goes to zero, we know that to satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions, some amount will be
p r o d u c e da n ds o l di ne a c hm a r k e ti ne v e r yp e r i o d ,a l t h o u g ht h o s ea m o u n t sw i l le v e n t u a l l yb e c o m e










Since prices must be equal across the markets at all times including the start, we can solve for the










Although prices are the same, the quantities will diﬀer according to the elasticities and the
demand-shifting parameter. Integrating (7) over time, we can express cumulative extraction for





























With that solution, the entire optimal paths are determined.
52.2 Monopolist’s Problem

















t )dt − K0
¶
. (11)
Along the proﬁt-maximizing path of resource sales in each market, the following ﬁrst-order condi-
tions must hold:
qA
t > 0,M R A(qA
t )=ertλ; (12)
qB
t > 0,M R B(qB
t )=ertλ; (13)
where MRi denotes marginal revenue in market i.T h eﬁnal condition is the same stock constraint
as (4), although the actual shadow value may diﬀer. Thus, for the monopolist to sell in both
markets, their marginal revenues must be equal in each period, reﬂecting equivalent scarcity costs.
Marginal revenues in each market must rise at the rate of interest. With constant elasticity demand,


















t ); i = A,B. (14)
Solving for q
i,M









However, although this Hotelling rule seems the same for the planner and the monopolist, the
relative prices are diﬀerent, meaning that the paths do diverge. Setting marginal revenues equal
to each other, we see the monopolist does not want prices to be equal in the two markets if the











6From this result, we can prove three statements comparing monopolist resource use with the
planner’s with respect to prices, quantities, and welfare:
Theorem 1 Proposition 2 When assumptions 1 to 3 hold, the monopolist raises the price in the
market with relatively inelastic demand and lowers it in the market with relatively elastic demand
compared with the optimal (planner’s) price.




t ; the monopolist wants a
lower price in the market with more elastic demand for all t. From (12) and (13), monopoly prices
in each market must rise at the rate of interest; from (2) and (3), optimal prices are the same in
each market and rise at the rate of interest. Thus, if PS
t <P
A,M
t for any t, it must hold for all
t. Suppose now that the price path in market A were the same as the planner’s, while that in B
were lower, implying greater sales in that market in every period. Over the same horizon, then,
total extraction would be greater for the monopolist, thereby violating the stock constraint. (By






t for all t, then the monopolist would extract less over
the same horizon, implying a slack stock constraint, which violates the monopolist’s conditions for
optimality.) Thus, the monopolist’s equilibrium must have higher prices than optimal in market A
in all periods, and prices in market B must be lower than optimal.
Corollary 3 Consumers in the market with relatively inelastic demand obtain less of the resource
in each period and overall with monopoly provision, while those in the market with relatively elastic
demand obtain more of the resource in each period and overall.
Proof. This result follows from the previous theorem: since P
A,M
t >P S





for all t.S i n c eP
B,M
t <P S





















Corollary 4 Compared with the social optimum, consumers in the market with relatively elastic
demand are better oﬀ under monopoly provision, as is the monopolist, while consumers in the
market with relatively inelastic demand are worse oﬀ,a si ss o c i e t yo v e r a l l .









t for all t,c o n s u m e r si nB are unambiguously
7better oﬀ with monopoly provision while those in A are unambiguously worse oﬀ. The monopolist
is better oﬀ by deﬁnition of proﬁt maximization, while society overall is worse oﬀ by deﬁnition of
welfare maximization, since the two paths diﬀer.
We can show that the price path for relatively inelastic market A gets shifted up, while that of B
gets shifted down, compared with the planner’s path. The dual to this result is that the extraction
path for market B gets shifted up, while that of A gets shifted down, compared with the planner’s.
However, either market could still be the larger than the other, depending again on the relative
demand parameters.
To solve for the complete system of extraction, we must combine the ﬁrst-order conditions with
the stock constraint. Cumulative extraction for each market is the same function of initial resource











However, the initial extraction terms will diﬀer for the monopolist. From (15) we solve for initial


















Then, substituting this result with (16) into the stock constraint (4), we arrive at the equation
























Recall that µ represents the relative size of the market. From (10) and (18), we can observe that




0 , and we are back in the Stiglitz world,
where the monopolist behaves like the planner in providing to a single market.
2.3 Total Extraction with Two Markets
We have shown that the extraction paths of the planner and the monopolist diverge when facing
two markets with diﬀerent elasticities. But what does this imply for the path of total extraction
8and thereby the rate of depletion of the single resource?
Theorem 5 Proposition 6 When assumptions 1 to 3 hold, total extraction by the monopolist is
greater than that by the planner in the initial period.











for j = S,M .S o l v i n gf o rq
B,j
0 ,w eg e tq
B,j




0 , which lets us write the total initial
extraction Q0 for each actor, j,a sQ
j








0 . Subtracting the planner’s initial



















Although the monopolist contracts supply in the market with less elastic demand, it expands
it in the market with more elastic demand, with the net eﬀect being an initial increase in total
supply.
Corollary 7 The monopolist follows a faster extraction path than the planner.
Proof. The previous theorem states that total extraction is higher for the monopolist initially,
but it cannot be so indeﬁnitely, else the stock constraint would be violated. Thus, at some point the
extraction paths must cross, with the monopolist’s total extraction being less than the planner’s in
later periods. Therefore, the monopolist’s extraction path must be steeper.
In other words, the monopolist will tend to be less “conservationist” than the planner. Fur-
thermore, we see from (20) that this tilting of the total extraction path must be greater when the
market elasticities diverge to a greater extent.
2.4 Monopolist Extraction with Arbitrage
Does arbitrage between the two markets eliminate the monopolist’s incentive to behave diﬀerently




t ). Whereas in the segregated markets case we worked with inverse
demand, in this case we will simplify the expressions as a function of the common price P1
t .W i t h
our constant-elasticity demand, we can write qi
t = µi(P1
t )−ηi. In other words, at any price the
monopolist faces a single, uniﬁed demand schedule of Q(P1
t )=µA(P1
t )−ηA +µB(P1
t )−ηB, which no
longer displays constant elasticity. The point elasticity is now the average of the individual market
elasticities, weighted by output:









which collapses to a constant as µi → 0 or ηA → ηB.
On the optimal path, the monopolist always wants marginal revenue–this time with respect
to total output–to rise at the rate of interest, or P1
t (1 − 1/¯ ηt)=ertλ. The rate of change in the










¯ ηt − 1
¶
.
Since we assume ηB > ηA > 1,t h e n¯ ηt > 1. Thus, whether the price rises faster or slower than
the interest rate depends on whether the total elasticity is rising or falling, and we show it to be
falling:













Since the eﬀective elasticity falls as the price rises, in equilibrium P1
t >e rtP1
0.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
with an arbitrage constraint, the monopolist will choose a steeper price path than the planner: the
monopolist prefers to lower prices in relatively elastic periods and raise prices in relatively inelastic
ones, resulting in lower initial prices and higher ones later on. A steeper price path over the same
t i m eh o r i z o nw i t ht h es a m es t o c kc o n s t r a i n ti m p l i es that the monopolist’s initial price must be
lower than the planner’s: P1
0 <P S
0 . This in turn implies that starting consumption is greater in








0 . Thus, total extraction is greater at the
beginning, and the monopolist is again less conservationist than the planner. This result is similar
to that of Stiglitz (1976) and others who note that if the elasticity of demand increases over time,
the monopolist picks a more conservationist path relative to the social planner. However, these
10increases are modeled as exogenous changes to an elasticity that is otherwise constant with respect
to price within any period. Here, by presenting overall demand as the sum of distinct markets
each with constant elasticities of demand, we arrive at an eﬀective elasticity that is decreasing in
price, and thus decreasing over time. Thus, our example corresponds to the extension by Lewis
(1976) and Lewis, Matthews, and Burness (1979), who consider a stationary demand schedule with
elasticity increasing in consumption.
In summary, without arbitrage, the monopolist will follow the optimal (Hotelling) rule for the
price paths but will diﬀer from the social planner with respect to the relative prices between markets.
With arbitrage, the monopolist’s relative prices between markets coincide with the planner’s, but as
a consequence the monopolist’s price path is distorted. In both cases, the existence of two markets
with diﬀerent elasticities causes the monopolist to behave diﬀerently from the planner and, overall,
to follow a steeper path of depletion. A caveat to this conclusion comes from Stiglitz (1976), who
notes that when the price of a resource is projected to rise faster than the interest rate, speculators
will seize the opportunity and buy the resource, causing its current price to increase until, with no
storage costs, the price is projected to rise no faster than the interest rate. Thus, when there is
arbitrage both between time periods and among markets, the monopolist is further restricted in
its ability to control prices, as speculation may limit increases to the rate of interest. One then
concludes that the monopolist’s equilibrium price path will rise at least as steeply as that of the
social planner.
3C o n c l u s i o n
This paper illustrates an important extension to the literature on the extraction of a depletable
resource by a monopoly. We ﬁnd that the ability to extract at zero marginal cost and sell in two
constant-elasticity markets, with or without arbitrage between them, leads a monopolist to extract
a resource at a faster-than-optimal rate. This result suggests that when a monopolist is able to
price-discriminate between two sets of consumers, then the group with relatively elastic demand
is better oﬀ, and the group with relatively inelastic demand is worse oﬀ with monopoly provision
than under the social planner. Overall, there may be signiﬁcant welfare losses associated with
unregulated monopoly provision.
11Needless to say, our assumption of iso-elastic demand, though a “natural ﬁrst approximation”
(Stiglitz 1976), is restrictive and the assumption of exogeneity of the resource stock needs to be
tested. Indeed, incorporating the ability of resource owners to expand the supply of resource
through exploration and innovation may prove a particularly fruitful avenue of research, as models
that incorporate an endogenous stock of resource, without the potential for two markets (Gaudet
and Lasserre 1988), indicate that the monopolist extracts too slowly. This suggests that a model
incorporating the potential for both discovering new stock of the resource and selling it in multiple
markets may be worthwhile to pursue.
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